Stock tumble indicates investors grasp Pandora's royalties complications

Paul Maloney
December 7, 2012 - 12:10pm

Pandora this week (here) reported very positive financial and usage growth for its fiscal quarter that ended October 31. They also released impressive usage numbers for the month of November (the Webcast Metrics report for October, here, was also typically positive for the industry's leading webcaster).

And when a company has a $1.32 billion market cap, and reports these numbers, record labels and performers howl that Pandora would dare try to pay them less.

The first problem, as tech venture capitalist and blogger Fred Wilson explains, is that lots of people don't understand (or ignore) what "valuation" or "market cap" means. (Wilson recently spoke to Billboard's Bill Werde, who asked about Spotify's and Pandora's market caps.)

"(That) valuation is nonsense," he writes here (regarding Spotify specifically, but also Pandora indirectly). "Nobody bought their company for billions in cash. They are simply financings in which money traded hands on terms that spit out those big numbers."

Naturally, those types of figures make for good PR fodder. After all, how could Pandora complain? Billions of dollars! But for the small problem Wilson points out: the market cap isn't real money. 

"But of course the record label executives don't care... They just look at the huge numbers and say 'f**k that.'"

In his talk with Werde (there's video on Wilson's site), Wilson goes on to point out that focusing on things like market valuation "complicates and prolongs" real royalty negotiations. "Maybe if these companies blow up and sell for ten cents on the dollar, someone will wake up and do the right thing."

And regarding those royalties (the second problem): right there in its Q3 report is the fact that while Pandora's revenues were $120 million -- up 60% from the same period last year -- the company's "content acquisition costs" (aka royalties) rose 75%. That's $65.7 million for the quarter, or 55% of gross revenue.

Look at Pandora's soaring mobile usage -- it's now 77% of total listening. But Pandora reportedly gets only $21.56 in advertising per 1,000 hours of mobile listening, compared to $55.18 for the same listening on desktop computers. Yet the royalty rates Pandora pays are the same, regardless of the device listeners use. Usage increases, royalties increase (they're set to go up in 2015), but revenue per listener falls as more migrate to mobile.

"In other words, the more successful Pandora becomes, the more it loses. And those through-the-looking-glass economics of Internet radio set off the drop in Pandora shares," wrote The Wall Street Journal yesterday here.

New guidance from Trefis (here) reads, "If content acquisition costs (as % of revenues) do not come down and stay around the current levels of 57% estimated for fiscal 2013 (calendar 2012), there could be downside of about 35% to our price estimate."

The fact that Pandora's stock indeed fell 20% after its Q3 report, and is trading near its 52-week low, indicates that while labels execs, performers, and lawmakers may not grasp the reality of Pandora's situation, Wall Street does.

Paul Maloney
December 7, 2012 - 12:10pm

All Things D's Peter Kakfa wrote last week, "Question to the people putting money into streaming music start-ups in 2012: What are you thinking?"

Given today's top story in RAIN, this seemed like a good time to circle back around to this story, a tech VC's recent testimony on Capitol Hill, and an rebuttal from former Last.fm exec Matthew Hawn in GigaOm.

Kafka, like Fred Wilson, points out the problem with "market caps" and real royalty costs:

"Yes, public investors value Pandora at something like $1.4 billion. And private investors think Spotify is worth at least $3 billion... But even those guys are in a precarious position, because they’ve yet to demonstrate that they can afford the cost of music they’re either selling or giving away. And they’re competing with the likes of Apple and Microsoft, which can afford to lose money on this stuff because they think it can help their real businesses."

He then points back to tech VC David Pakman's testimony from the recent House Judiciary subcommitte hearing on the Internet Radio Fairness Act. "Pakman used to run a digital music company himself and, like nearly every single person who leaves digital music, he has vowed to never go back until the licensing climate changes.

'Although we have met many great entrepreneurs with great product ideas, we have resisted investing in digital music largely for one reason — the complications and conditions of the state of music licensing.'"

Hawn (the former Last.fm guy) says Kafka and Pakman are focusing too much on companies that rely on publishing/performance rights for streaming and downloading. He argues there's lots of room for innovative music start-ups that focus on other areas, like live music, promotion and discovery, and B2B services.

He suggests start-ups reinvent spaces like creating a better marketplace for licensing of music to TV, games, advertising and film; or becoming the Threadless or Etsy of band merchandising.

Interestingly, he writes: "The accounting system that underlies the publishing and performance rights is one of the most rotten and complicated things about the industry. It’s only getting worse as are more digital products and services are created... A music start-up built on transparency, great analytics and paying artists faster and more fairly would be the most disruptive music business ever."

So, where they all seem to agree is: don't start or invest in a company that relies on licensing recorded music at a reasonable rate.

Read Kafka here, Pakman here, and Hawn here.