To
read Part 1 of this two-part editorial --
"RIAA may win the battle but lose the war (and billions
of dollars)" -- click here.
If the RIAA and its member labels continue
their current aggressively adversarial approach, they risk losing
a royalty right that could be worth billions
of dollars to them in the long run. But here's how they can save
the day!(Part 2 of 2)
BY KURT HANSON Its not too late for the record industry to position
itself as the friend of music
lovers, not their enemy. By stepping forward
and proposing an accommodation that could save
Internet radio, the industry would be taking a huge step
in that direction!
And this makes good financial sense for the RIAA and its
member labels as well.
For the long-term benefit of their member labels,in
my opinion, the RIAA should stand down from its current adversarial
position (500% of past revenues and 200% of current revenues
is barely sufficient!) and offer terms that would
(A) provide a healthy new income stream for record
labels and artists (B) without
killing the nascent webcasting industry.
Here is the outline of a proposal that I think that the record
industry could afford to make and that webcasters could live with.
And that would thus be in labels'
best interest because it would probably keep the entire "sound
recordings performance royalty" concept for Internet radio
from being second-guessed by Congress...and potentially lost forever.
Proposed terms on royalty rate:
3.75% of revenues, $500 minimum For decades, composers of songs have
received a royalty rate for U.S. radio airplay of their songs, on
top of the compensation provided by the promotion value of the exposure
of their songs, of about 3%of station revenues. In Europe,
where there is a long history of paying a royalty to both composers
and performers, the sound
recordings performance royalty is generally set at a similar
royalty rate to the composers royalty rate.
These two pieces of history suggest a reasonable solution
for Internet radio:
The royalty rate should be set somewhere near
the same rate that composers get and certainly no
more than, say, 150% of that. In other words, a reasonable royalty
rate might fall somewhere in the range between
3% and 4.5% of revenues; the midpoint of that range would
be 3.75% of revenues.
Note that the high end of that proposed rate range (i.e.,
4.5%) happens, probably coincidentally, to be somewhat consistent
with the CARPs recommendation. According to the 146-page "CARP
Report" written by the arbitrators, the RIAA initially set
a sweet spot in their negotiations with webcasters of
$.004/performance or 15% of revenues. Proposing a royalty of $.0014/performance,
the arbitrators gave the RIAA about 1/3
of their "sweet spot" rate. Giving them the
same fraction of their percentage-of-revenues
sweet spot rate would suggest a royalty rate of 5.25%
of revenues. (In other words, even though the Yahoo!/RIAA deal is
from the heart of the crazy dotcom era, if we convert the arbitrators'
decision into a percentage-of-royalties rate, we are still in the
same ballpark.)
And a $500 minimum for genuine commercial operations does
not seem that unreasonable.
Minimums, variations, and exceptions Certain categories of webcasters warrant additional
detail:
Small commercial webcasters
For small commercial webcasters
(most of whom got into
this business originally because they were music fans who wanted
to give exposure to new genres and artists) who have little
or no revenues to speak of yet a reasonable floor
for a royalty rate might be the greater of (A) $500 or
(B) a certain percentage of expenses
(e.g., 4.5%).
Terrestrial broadcasters
For terrestrial
broadcasterswho
are simply streaming a simulcast
of their AM or FM broadcast, you may feel that a lower rate
is appropriate. Unfortunately, the CARP Report based the simulcast
discountsimply on mimicking
the terms of the RIAA/Yahoo! deal and did not describe a rationale
for that discount. (Possible rationales include the fact that
simulcasters are unable to offer such Internet-only features
as a low spot load, a skip button, or narrow niche
formats.)
Noncommercial and
public radio stations
For noncommercial
and public radio stations,
the CARP was of course correct in recommending a significantly
lower rate. The CARP recommended 1/7
of the commercial rate and a discount in that range seems reasonable.
Hobbyists
This is a new category that
has only come up in discussions recently...but for true music
fans who have no significant commercial intent, even a $500
minimum royalty would be steep.
Excluded revenues
It does not make sense for
the RIAA to collect a royalty percentage on certain types of
revenues. Excluded should be such items as voluntary listener
contributions, CD sales commissions (as the RIAA members will
already profit far more from any CD sales than the station will),
and so forth (e.g., station logo merchandise purchases are a
form of voluntary contributions)
For conglomerates, offer an appropriate
flat-rate OPTION each year Finally, for corporate conglomerates with multiple
revenue streams that may not be specifically and clearly associated
with
their streamed audio (e.g., AOL,
MSN,
Yahoo!, and perhaps
some larger broadcasters), giving those conglomerates the right
to elect a flat-rateoption
would benefit everyone involved.
However, the proposed $.0014/ performance rate is too high.
(The CARP felt legally obligated to use a rate from one deal back
in the heart of the dotcom craziness era two years ago. It makes
no sense in 2002. I've said it before and I'll say it again: A royalty
rate that works out to 200% of revenues (in the current advertising
environment) is not reasonable.) It will kill the industry.
My proposed solution for setting a flat rate optionwould
be based on the following two precepts: (1) The
flat rate should currently be set reasonably but should groweach year as the advertising
market for Internet radio begins to develop. (2) Corporate
conglomerates are probably capable of bringing in more
revenues per hour than other webcasters (as they have
existing sales staffs and can bundle Internet radio spots into larger
advertising packages).
Using those precepts, the flat rate for each
calendar year could be set in the following manner:
(A) Each
year, calculate typical
industry revenues per listener-hour, based on the 10 largest
webcasters who pay their royalty on a percent-of-revenues basis.
(B)
Assume that big conglomerates could bring in, say, 50%
more per listener-hour than that, for the reasons previously
described. Call that the "imputed revenues per listener-hour."
(C)
Multiply
the appropriate %-of-revenues royalty rate for that category
of webcaster (e.g., 3% to 4.5%) by the imputed revenues per
hour to determine that year's flat
rate per listener-hour.
(Alternative
plan: To create a flat rate per "performance"
instead, use major webcasters' number of song "performances"
per year to calculate a revenues-per-performance in step A and
you can come up with a flat rate per performance in step C.)
(D) Then
give webcasters the choice
of selecting the flat-rate option if they prefer.
Voila! That four-step process generates a flat-rate option
that makes things easier for everyone
to determine an appropriate royalty payment from the big conglomerates
who can't clearly separate out their Internet radio revenues.
(CONTINUED BELOW)
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(FROM
ABOVE) Proposed reporting requirements:
Three accurate data points, three days per year Even if you're with me so far, reasonable
royalty rates wont keep the nascent webcasting industry alive
if the associated reporting and recordkeeping
requirements are so complex and
expensive that they kill it. There are two key questions: How much
data do webcasters need to provide, and how often?
Three simple data points song title, artist name,
and album title should be sufficient to identify the vast,
vast majority of the sound recordings played on Internet radio.
The arguments presented thus far for multiple and often-redundant
pieces of additional information are spurious, particularly when
considered on a cost-benefit basis.
In the recent Copyright Office roundtable, for example,
the RIAA and SoundExchange
(John Simson, executive director,
pictured above) asked for many
more data points, explaining that they may need additional information
when the first three data points are not provided accurately
e.g., when song was ripped from a compilation CD and the artist
is mistakenly listed as Various Artists. But that type
of problem can simply be addressed by requiring webcasters to provide
accurate data in each of the
three fields!
Another problem raised by a record exec who was present in
Washington DC was the problem of identifying the background artists
on different radio promo mixes
of a song. This is simply a cost-benefit
issue it could cost the webcasting industry millions
of
dollars per year to provide all of the additional data points required,
yet the net effect in the distribution of royalty checks to background
artists might be as little as plus or minus $5 per musician. (Note
that background musicians as a class would receive the full amount
due; we're only talking about subtle differences in how it's distributed).
Such a skew in costs vs. benefit is not rational public policy.
Similarly, the number of times that different recordings,
with different beneficiaries of the royalty, will have the exact
same song title, artist name, and
album title will probably be a fraction of a fraction of a percent
of songs played. "De minimus" is the relevant legal term.
It's not good public policy to require one firm to spend millions
of dollars so another industry can redistribute hundreds of dollars.
Sample vs. census The other question is whether webcasters should be required
to provide a sample of their
programming (e.g., the three days per year they provide to ASCAP
and BMI) or a census (i.e.,
listing each song they play to each listener all year).
The truth is, a carefully-produced three-day sample of data
each year will deliver more accurate information than a not-as-carefully-produced
census. (True, each artists royalty checks will be a few dollars
too high or too low each payment cycle, reflecting the margin of
error of the sample, but that effect will average
out across three or four such cycles.) A three-day sample
system has worked well for ASCAP and BMI for decades and will work
well here.
On the other hand, reporting requirements may be an aspect
of the issue that the RIAA and webcasters can leave in the hands
of the Copyright Office. But a good deal of goodwill could be generated
if a compromise was to be offered.
Webcasters can offer more
to labels and artists, too In conclusion, I should point
out that the webcasters are capable of offering additional value
to labels and artists and I believe most of them would be
glad to do so.
For example, most webcasters have already added features
to the webcasts that are designed to encourage the purchase of CDs
album cover images that display while
songs are playing, links to CDNow
or Amazon to buy the
album thats playing, lists of the past five or ten songs played
(with purchase links), etc. Webcasters are doing this both for ulterior
motives (they may get a small commission on each CD sold) and altruistic
reasons (they are genuinely fans of the music they play and want
to promote their selected genre of music).
They can be encouraged to do more perhaps links to
artists websites and tour schedules, promotional announcements
every hour encouraging CD purchases, etc. They would probably be
happy to do more. Remember,
again, people who chose to enter the radio industry are almost always
music fans!
The next move must be the record
industry's But the next move has to be made by the RIAA (or, failing
that, its member labels).
The webcasters are fighting to keep their small businesses
from being bankrupted right now, this spring. But the record labels
are in a position where they can afford to and need to
take a longer-term perspective.
They are putting a potential multi-billion-dollar future revenue
stream at risk if they shortsightedly allow that bankruptcy scenario
to happen.
"Makes
it possible for many new providers of content and services..."
This is not for attribution, unfortunately, because I am
doing some current work with the recording industry.
No time, no talk. I think that your notes today are right
on target, as usual. I actually think it even goes a bit further.
Not only has the record industry done a remarkable job in pissing
off over the years every important constituency that it needs and
serves, the appallingly bad
performance of the radio industry in the current oligopoly that
Congress permitted (but didn't intend) magnifies the general anger
of the communities being served. The result, as you note, is a huge
potential backlash.
The recording industry, as you know, has a long and nasty
history of nearly or completely illegal behavior (mob-controlled
distribution channels, payola, etc.), intentionally screwing artists
out of royalties due (as is true in the film business), and failing
to even minimally serve niche or fringe audiences (which gives lots
of nice opportunities to niche labels, but distribution remains
a huge barrier).
At the same time, local format competition in our old friend
radio has nearly entirely died due to consolidation, ad inventory
is overloaded and playlists are narrowed.
As a result, the opportunity for broad content to be heard
by potential buyers on major distribution is probably the most restricted
in the last 30 years. This results, as you note, in not only the
listeners being angry but also the artists. Imagine the difficulty
for a new artist to "break." It's enormous.
I think that among the possible outcomes of this is the
following sequence of events:
(1) Billington approves the CARP in substantially the
manner offered. (I don't blame him, and don't think he has much
choice. His process was long, expensive, and by the book. To overturn
it would suggest the overturn of many other similar CARP proceedings.
He may approve and suggest that Congress review the Act.)
(2) There is a swell of anger from both artists and listeners.
(3) Congress gets into the act. A very prolonged lobbying
effort ensues (never diminish the power and motivation of big
media to influence Washington). This lasts for at least two years.
(4) At the end a poor compromise is reached, but one that
generally favors an open market, blanket %-of-revenue agreements,
and a payment process that bypasses the record industry entirely
(because they have shown time and time again that they cannot
be trusted to make agreed-to payments).
This compromise makes it possible for many new providers
of content and services to emerge, as we all hoped and tried over
the past few years. All types of content released will be formulaic,
including electronic distribution of owned content. This will permit
small providers of services to grow and reasonably thrive and, within
10 years or so, a real new set of niche providers will have grown
up. Big radio and big records will suffer somewhat, but not disastrously,
and both listeners and artists will have greater opportunities.