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BY KURT HANSON
In this week's previous issues of RAIN (here,
here, and
here), drawing
from a speech entitled "The Future
of Radio that I've been delivering
at radio conferences around the world lately (and which will have
its U.S. debut at our "RAIN Reader Cocktail Party"
next week in Las Vegas), I've been making the following argument:
There are technological and cultural changes going on right
now that will have a major impact
on how consumers will access and use radio in the future.
And if U.S. broadcasters react to these cultural and technological
changes inappropriately, it's possible that, after the dust settles,
we could see an entire new set of leading
radio broadcasters!
Today, we'll look at a theory espoused by a best-selling
author and Harvard professor that explains why, when it comes to
new technologies, broadcasters may be betting
on the wrong horse and, by doing so, may be putting
their entire companies at risk.
Great firms usually respond inappropriately
to "disruptive" technologies
According to the thesis compellingly presented
by Harvard professor Clayton M. Christensen
in his book The
Innovator's Dilemma, there is a certain
type of technological change that leads to a situation in
which virtually all of the leading firms
in a given industry are wiped
out!
This happens, ironically, precisely because the
leaders follow what are traditionally considered to
be "good business practices"
e.g., being in tune with competitors, listening to customers,
and investing aggressively in new technologies.
Christensen uses examples from a wide variety of different industries
including disk drives, mechanical excavators, retail, steel
mills, and even manufacturers of radio devices in which the
leading firms were confronted with a specific type of "disruptive"
technological change, reacted in a seemingly-appropriate manner,
and totally lost their industry leadership
as a result.
And I believe that today's radio group owners (Clear Channel,
Infinity, Emmis, Cox, ABC, Entercom, Cumulus, SBS, Radio One, HBC,
Susquehanna, Jefferson-Pilot, Citadel, Bonneville, etc.) are facing
that exact type of technological
change right now... and are
behaving exactly in the manner that Christensen predicts!
Disk drive industry has seen five
generations
of great leading firms sequentially fail
"Those who study genetics avoid studying humans,"
Christensen observes, because generations come along too infrequently.
Instead, they study fruit flies,
because they are conceived, born, mature, and die all in a single
day.
Analogously, "If you want to understand why something happens
in business, study the disk
drive industry. Those companies are the closest thing
to fruit flies that the business world has ever seen."
To summarize 66 pages into just a few paragraphs: Roughly every
four years between 1975 and 1990, there was a set of a dozen or
so leading firms in the disk drive industry. Each generation was
faced with a new technology, they reacted using "good"
business practices, and virtually all of them were wiped
out (they either failed or were acquired) shortly thereafter
as a result.
How in the world could this have happened? Christensen differentiates
between two types of technological changes:
- "Sustaining technologies" are those that improve
the performance of existing products. Industry leaders
have no problems maintaining their industry leadership when faced
with sustaining technological changes.
- "Disruptive technologies," on the other hand,
appear on the scene offering worse performance
than existing products. (Example: The first 5.25-inch disk drives
were slower, had less capacity, and had a higher price per megabyte
than the leaders' existing 8-inch disk drives.)
When
disruptive technologies appear on the scene, the leading firms
survey their best customers (which is, of course, a "good"
business practice). In this example, they would have asked, "Do
you have any interest in a smaller drive that's slower, has a lower
capacity, and has a higher price per megabyte?"
Their best customers (in this example, minicomputer manufacturers)
say "No." As a result, the leaders
allocate their corporate resources elsewhere toward
sustaining technologies that eventually offer better
performance than their
customers are willing to pay for.
Meanwhile, a new set of small companies typically appears
on the scene to develop the disruptive technology. They have a lower
cost structure.
They find new, small markets
(in this example, the newly-emerging category of desktop PC manufacturers)
that value the benefits offered by the new technology.
And then here's the key: The disruptive technology gets
better! At some point (see the circle on the chart above),
the disruptive technology gets good enough to meet the needs of
the mass market. Meanwhile, because the industry leaders have put
all their corporate resources into building performance improvements
that are beyond what their customers are
willing to pay for, they have failed to develop a reputation
(or the skill set) in the new technology.
So that new set of small companies becomes the
new set of industry leaders! And Christensen finds this
pattern repeated in industry after industry mechanical excavators,
motorcycles, laser vs. ink-jet printers, insulin, radios (tubes
vs. transistors (pictured)), steel mills, retailing, and many others.
Is Internet-delivered radio a disruptive
technology? And are broadcasters reacting as predicted?
If you go back to Monday's issue of RAIN (here),
you'll see that we discussed the strengths and weaknesses of Internet-delivered
radio.
I wrote on Monday, "Note, however, that on several key
attributes of performance, Internet radio is a lower-quality
product
at least today, anyway than broadcast radio. (This
fact will become extremely important
later this week when we look at the type
of new technology that Internet radio is...)
"Specifically, most Internet radio stations today choose
to stream at a bitrate that means they have worse
sound quality than FM radio. And it's not
portable you can't listen in the bathroom or kitchen
or in your car or on a Walkman. And the Internet-only stations typically
have dead
air between songs and lack such 'quality' elements
as DJs and contests."
If broadcasters survey their best customers their
P-1s they will probably find that those customers are perfectly
happy with AM/FM-delivered radio. ("Would you like
our programming in lower quality on computer
speakers with worse DJs?" "No!")
So broadcasters are instead spending hundreds
of millions of dollars investing in a sustaining technology,
digital radio (a/k/a DAB or
HD Radio). This will allow consumers to hear FM programming in CD
quality or AM programming in FM quality, if
they're willing to buy a complete new set of radio devices.
(Discussed yesterday in RAIN here.)
Meanwhile, a new set of companies has emerged to develop
Internet-delivered radio. They are finding new
markets that value its particular set of benefits (e.g.,
office workers without radios at their desks, fans of niche musical
formats like electronica, Americana, jazz, and Broadway, etc.).
And thus webcasters like Radio@AOL,
Yahoo! Launch,
Radio
Free Virgin, Radioio,
MusicMatch,
Beethoven.com,
3WK, and
even our own AccuRadio
are developing a skill set and
a reputation among consumers
for Internet-delivered radio.
This is playing out just as Christensen predicts!
Will Internet radio satisfy the
mass market
just as broadcasters ask consumers to buy HD radios?
According to Christensen's theory, and it's almost certainly
true, Internet radio will get better.
As more consumers get broadband and bandwidth prices continue to
fall, webcasters will stream at higher bitrates. With new releases
of RealAudio
and WindowsMedia,
gaps between songs will shorten and eventually disappear. And with
the rollout of Wi-Fi and new devices (again, see yesterday's RAIN),
portability will happen in the not-too-distant future.

And particularly if customer priorities change, as described
in Adrian Slywotzky's 1996 book,
Value Migration, Internet radio's business design
might be remarkably well positioned.
I guess a key question for broadcasters is whether digital radio
("HD Radio" logo pictured above right) is a perfect example
of adding performance characteristics that are beyond
what consumers are going to be willing to pay for. (Is
FM quality perceived as unacceptable? Do listeners really want to
listen to Rush Limbaugh and baseball games in stereo?)
If digital radio is such a perfect
example, then the timing of HD Radio's rollout is perfect
for webcasters... and potentially very bad for today's set of leading
broadcasters.
(By the way, Christensen explains how a few firms in each
industry survived their industry's disruptive technological revolution.
Essentially, those firms spun out independent
companies to commercialize the disruptive technology
companies with totally independent management and much lower
cost structures. This is a path of behavior that, I believe,
not a single US broadcaster
has adopted. )
The future will arrive quickly
All of this "book learning" may seem like an irrelevant
intellectual exercise to broadcasters who are worried about hitting
this quarter's Wall Street earnings estimates. But, in fact, the
future is bearing down on us very quickly.
We'll look at that issue in tomorrow's issue of RAIN.
The fifth and final installment of RAIN's
"The Future of Radio" series is here.
The series begins here.
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The
US debut of Kurt's "The Future of Radio" speech
(in a slightly-condensed preview version) will take place next
week in Las Vegas, immediately preceding the RAIN
Reader Cocktail Party at Gordon Biersch Brewery Restaurant
(Tuesday, April 7th, at the new time:
4:30 PM). To reserve a seat for the presentation,
call 1-312-527-3879 or write
kurt@kurthanson.com. |

BY PAUL MALONEY
Record industry and webcasting representatives have reached
a tentative deal on webcasting royalties that would allow Internet
radio to pay 0.0762 cents per
listener per song, OR 1.17 cents
per aggregate tuning hour. (Subscription
services would be given an additional option: 10.9%
of revenue.) Their proposal has been submitted to the
U.S. Copyright Office.
A press release from the Digital Media Association (DiMA),
a lobbying group representing large webcasters, details the proposed
deal reached with the Recording Industry Association of America
(RIAA), the record industry
group. The proposed plan would apply to both commercial "eligible"
non-subscription and "new subscription services." The
deal would not apply to noncommercial
or nonprofit webcasters, AM or FM broadcasters simulcasting their
on-air programming on the Internet, or those webcasters who've elected
to pay royalties under the Small Webcaster Settlement Act (SWSA).
According to DiMA, among the companies that have agreed to
DiMA's submission of this proposal are RealNetworks,
Yahoo!,
America Online,
Microsoft,
MusicMatch,
Listen.com
and FullAudio.
The proposal includes a $2,500 minimum fee for webcasters
(except subscription services choosing the "percentage of revenue"
deal,
for whom the minimum is $5000). Notice and recordkeeping rules were
not addressed in the agreement.
"The agreement is a temporary band-aid that avoids millions
of dollars of legal fees associated with a broken arbitration process,"
said DiMA Executive Director Jonathan Potter
(pictured right) in the press statement.
He went on to stress that the "stability" webcasters
might gain by the proposed deal, they "remain at a competitive disadvantage
to terrestrial radio by having to pay huge royalties for sound recordings
that broadcasters get for free."
Moreover, Potter's group supports recent Congressional efforts to
revise CARP arbitrartion rules (see RAIN here),
as "the arbitration process that determines these royalties
is sorely in need of reform."
The Copyright Office will likely publish the proposal for
review and comment, and then make its decision on whether to approve
it on an industry-wide basis. While its reviewed, webcasters and
copyright owners will have a chance to comment or file objections
with the Copyright Office. Webcasters eligible for the SWSA will
continue to maintain the option of electing to pay by that plan.
| DiMA and RIAA Joint Royalty Proposal |
| License Fees: |
|
| Eligible Nonsubscription
Transmission Services |
Option of paying royalties as follows:
· Per Performance Option
- 0.0762 cents ($0.000762) per performance, except that 4% of
performances shall bear no royalty.
· Aggregate Tuning Hour Option
- 1.17 cents ($0.0117) per aggregate tuning hour. |
| New Subscription
Services |
Option of paying royalties as follows:
· Per Performance Option
- 0.0762 cents ($0.000762) per performance, except that 4% of
performances shall bear no royalty.
· Aggregate Tuning Hour Option
- 1.17 cents ($0.0117) per aggregate tuning hour.
· Percentage of Subscription Revenues
Option - 10.9% of "Subscription Service Revenues,"
but in no event less than 27 cents per month for each person
who subscribes to the subscription service or to whom service
is delivered without a fee (e.g., during a trial period). |
| Minimum Fees: |
|
| Nonsubscription Services |
$2,500 per year |
| Subscription Services |
· Per Performance Option
& Aggregate Tuning Hours Option - $2,500 per year.
· Percentage of Subscription Revenues
Option - $5,000 per year. |
Look for more details and analysis on this story tomorrow in
RAIN.
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If
you're planning to attend NAB 2003 in Las Vegas (April 5-10;
details here),
we hope you'll join us for our RAIN reader get-togther.
We've reserved the patio of the Gordon Biersch Brewery Restaurant
(about a $4 cab ride from the Convention Center) on Tuesday,
April 8th.
This year, we've also reserved a private room for the U.S.
debut of Kurt's "The Future of
Radio" speech for those who'd like an advance
look at it. (Please note we've moved the time up a bit. The
presentation will now be at 4:30pm,
and cocktails at 5:00pm.) See
you there! |
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